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NOTES AND COMMENTS
DIVORCE
THE DOCTRINE OF RECRIMINATION
Libel for divorce by wife alleging statutory grounds of cruel and
abusive treatment. The libelee answered that the libelant "has spent
a great deal of time in the company of a certain young man . . . and
has been on terms of intimacy with said man." This was not an
allegation of adultery. The trial judge held, although the wife proved
grounds for divorce, she was not entitled to a decree nisi as she was not
an innocent party. Reversed. The doctrine of recrimination does not
apply unless the libelant's act constitutes a stautory cause for divorce.
Reddington. v. Reddington, - Mass. - , 59 N.E. (2d) 775 (1945).
The statutory grounds for divorce are similar in Indiana and
Massachusetts.1 Indiana, however, expressly recognizes by statute the
doctrine of recrimination when the party seeking the divorce is guilty
of adultery; 2 while Massachusetts does not recognize the doctrine by
statute for any cause.3 Massachusetts, however, recognizes the doc-
trine by judicial decision.4 In the United States thirty-two jurisdic-
tions recognizes the doctrine of recrimination by statute.5 There are
eight types of recriminatory defense statutes, and the number of juris-
dictions using each type is as follows: complaint of adultery-defense of
adultery (15); complaint of any cause for divorce--defense of any
cause for divorce (6); complaint of any cause for divorce--defense of
same crime or misconduct (3); complaint of any cause for divorce-
defense of any cause of equal wrong (2); complaint of any cause
for divorce-defense of adultery (3) ; complaint of adultery-defense of
any cause for divorce (1) ; complaint of any cause for divorce-defense
of adultery or like cause for divorce (1) ; complaint of desertion, cruel-
ty, adultery, intoxication--defense of like conduct (1). 6
By judicial decision Indiana extends the doctrine of recrimination
to: complaint of cruel and inhuman treatment-defense of cruel and
inhuman treatment;7 complaint of adultery-defense of abandonment;8
complaint of any cause which is a ground for divorce-defense of any
cause which is a ground for divorce.9 The Supreme Court of Indiana
has said "Where each of the married parties has -committed a matri-
1. Compare Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §3-1201; Ind. Stat. Ann.
(Burns, 1943 Replacement) 3-1201, with Mass. Gen. Laws (Ter.
Ed. 1931) c. 208, §1, 2.
2. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933), §3-1202.
3. Mass. Gen. Laws (Ter. Ed. 1931) c. 208, §1, 2; See Reddington
v. Reddington, - Mass. - , 59 N.E. (2d) 775, 777 (1945).
4. Pratt v. Pratt, 157 Mass. 503, 32 N.E. 747 (1892); Morrison v.
Morrison, 142 Mass. 361, 8 N.E. 59 (1886); Robbins v. Robbins,
140 Mass. 528, 5 N.E. 837 (1886).
5. 2 Vernier, American Family Law (1932) 87.
6. Id.
7. Alexander v. Alexander, 140 Ind. 555, 38 N.E. 855 (1894).
8. Eikenbury v. Eikenbury, 33 Ind. App. 69, 70 N.E. 837 (1904).
9. See McMurrey v. McMurrey, 210 Ind. 595, 596, 4 N.E. (2d) 837
(1936) Alexander v. Alexander, 140 Ind. 555, 559, 38 N.E. 855,
856 (1894), cited supra note 7.
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monial offense, which is a cause for divorce, so that when one asks
for this remedy, the other is equally entitled to the same, whether the
offenses are the same or not, the court can grant the prayer of
neither."' 0
The rule announced by the Indiana"l and Massachusetts' 2 courts
seems a harsh one, but it is the rule followed by a majority of Ameri-
can jurisdictions. 3 It is based upon the principle that divorce is a
remedy only for an innocent party,' 4 and public policy is against grant-
ing divorces, except where an innocent person is injured, because of
the social interests of the state in maintaining the marriage relation-
ship. 15  Some jurisdictions have impliedly adopted the doctrine of
comparative rectitude as an exception to the doctrine of recrimination,
and will grant a decree to the party least in fault, where it appears
that the parties cannot live together and both are guilty of an offense
constituting ground for divorce.' 6 In the District of Columbia the
divorce laws have been liberalized so that recrimination is no longer
an absolute bar to divorce." The state of Washington has granted a
decree of divorce to both parties in a suit wherein each party proved
cruelty.18 Kansas, Minnesota, and Oklahoma provide by statute that
the court shall use its discretion as to whether a divorce will be granted
where recrimination is shown.19 A Nevada statute provides that the
court shall not deny a divorce on the ground of recrimination, but
may in its discretion grant a divorce to the party least in fault.
20
The courts of England, since 1857, have not been bound to deny divorces
to petitioners guilty of adultery.2' Switzerland, the Scandinavian
countries, Esthonia, and Germany all recognize divorce without fault
10. See Alexander v. Alexander, 140 Ind. 555, 559, 38 N.E. 855, 856
(1894), cited supra notes 7 and 9.
11. See McMurrey v. McMurrey, 210 Ind. 595, 596, 4 N.E. (2d) 837
(1936), cited supra note 9; Alexander v. Alexander, 140 Ind. 555,
38 N.E. 855 (1894), cited supra notes 7, 9, and 10.
12. Cumming v. Cumming, 135 Mass. 886 (1883).
18. 2 Vernier, American Family Laws (1932) 83.
14. See Mr. Justice Howard, in Alexander v. Alexander, 140 Ind. 555,
559, 88 N.E. 855, 856 (1894), quoting Stewart, Marriage and
Divorce, §314, "Divorce is a remedy provided for an innocent
party; a divorce granted to both parties is an anomaly; if both
parties have a right to a divorce, neither has"; Gullett v. Gullett,
25 Ind. 517 (1865); Eikenbury v. Eikenbury, 83 Ind. App. 69, 74,
70 N.E. 887, 839 (1904).
15. See Eikenbury v. Eikenbury, 33 Ind. App. 69, 72, 70 N.E. 837,
888 (1904), cited supra note 14.
16. Notes (1912) 63 A.L.R. 1132; Notes (1907) 6 Ann. Cas. 171.
17. D.C. Code (1940) tit. 16, §403; Vanderhuff v. Vanderhuff, 144
F. (2d) 509 (1944); Parks v. Parks, 116 F. (2d) 556 (1940).
18. Flagg v. Flagg, 192 Wash. 679, 74 P. (2d) 189 (1937).
19. 2 Vernier, American Family Laws (1932) 84.
20. Vernier, American Family Laws (Supp. 1938) 48.
21. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 3 (1857) ; 15 & 16 Geo. V, c. 49, s. 178 (1925);
1 Edw. VIII & 1 Geo. VI, c. 57, s. 4 (1937).
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of either party, or divorce by an action brought by a spouse, admittedly
guilty of marital offenses. 22
The doctrine of recrimination is hard to defend from a social view
point. It prevents the dissolution of the marital status of parties
whose conduct is admittedly unfavorable to a successful marriage.23
Where one party violates his marital duties the remedy of divorce is
granted.24
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
SUITS AGAINST THE STATE
Petitioner, non-resident Foreign manufacturing corporation, seeks
a refund of gross income taxes from the board of the department
of treasury' of the State of Indiana.2 The taxes were claimed to have
been derived from sales occurring in Indiana;3 petitioner alleged
violation of the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.4 United States District Court denied
recovery. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 5  Certiorari granted.6
Held, complaint dismissed. The consent of the State of Indiana t6
suit for a tax refund in the state court does not extend to suit in a
federal court.7 No decision on the merits. Ford Motor Co. v. Depart-
ment of Treasury of State of Indiana, et al., 65 Sup Ct. 347 (1945).
Petitioner's right to maintain this action in federal court depends
on (1) whether the action is against the individual or the state, and
(2) if against the state, whether the state has consented to suit in
22. Silving, "Divorce Without Fault" (1944) 29 Iowa L. Rev. 527.
23. See Vanderhuff v. Vanderhuff, 144 F. (2d) 509 (1944), cited supra
note 17.
24. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §3-1201; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns,
1943 Replacement) §3-1201.
1. The action is brought against the department of treasury of the
State of Indiana, and M. Clifford Townsend, Joseph M. Robertson,
and Frank G. Thompson, the Governor, Treasurer, and Auditor, re-
spectively, of the State of Indiana, who together constituted the
board of the department of treasury, as provided by Ind. Stat.
Ann. (Burns, 1943 Replacement) §64-2614. See Ind. Stat. Ann.
(Burns, 1943 Replacement) § 60-101.
2. Petitioner followed the statutory procedure for obtaining a re-
fund as set forth in hid. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1943 Replacement)
§64-2614 (a).
3. Indiana claimed the taxes under Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1943
Replacement) § 64-2602.
4. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1.
5. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of State of Indiana
et al., 141 F. (2d) 24 (C.C.A. 7th, 1944).
6. Id at 322 U.S. 721 (1944).
7. The suit was barred by U.S. Const. Amend. XI, "The judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens
or subjects of any foreign state." See Hyneman, "Judicial In-
terpretation of the Eleventh Amendment" (1927) 2 Ind. L. J. 371,
especially pps. 380-382.
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